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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Private Antitrust as a Public Good 1
Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin
and Compcare Health Services Insurance Corp.,
v. The Marshfield Clinic and Security Health
Plan of Wisconsin, Inc.
by Warren Greenberg

In February 1994, Blue Cross and Blue sician primary care and specialty markets. In
Shield United of Wisconsin ("Blue Cross") and addition, Blue Cross sought the divestiture of a
its wholly-owned health maintenance organiza- number of satellite primary care clinics which
tion ("HMO"), Compcare Health Services Marshfield Clinic had previously purchased from
("Compcare"), brought suit against the independent physicians. Finally, Marshfield
Marshfield Clinic("Marshfield"), a group of 400 Clinic was to be prohibited from allocating marphysicians, and its wholly owned HMO, Secu- kets with a number of nearby HMOs and clinics.
Although Compcare and Blue Cross
rity Health Plan, for their alleged violations of
2
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as well as would gain from the lower fees negotiated with
3
Marshfield physicians, and would potentially
State of Wisconsin antitrust statutes.
Blue Cross asserted in its Complaint that benefit from a more competitive physician serMarshfield Clinic physicians would not negoti- vices market, there are significant costs in litiate in good faith with Compcare and, in particu- gating this case. Moreover, other managed care
lar, would only allow a modest discount on plans and insuring organizations in the geocharges for Marshfield physicians who would graphic area might reap the benefits of a potencontract with Compcare HMO. 4 Moreover, tial Blue Cross victory and a more competitive
Marshfield Clinic physicians would not accept market without bearing the costs of litigation. In
any utilization controls on physician services. In short, they might be able to free ride on the poaddition, Blue Cross asserted that
it was paying higher fees for phyDr Warren Greenberg is a Professor of Health Economics
sician services because the northand Heal th Care Sciences at George Washington Univerwest Wisconsin area was monoposity, Wash ington, D.C. Dr.Greenbergreceived his Ph.D. in
lized by Marshfield.
Economic*sfrom Bryn Mawr College in 1972 with a conBlue Cross sought relief
which would allow its HMO to encentratioi in industrial organization. In the mid-1970s,
while stafjreconomist at the FederalTrade Commission, Dr
ter the market on reasonable payGreenberg concentratedon economic analysisof the health
ment terms. It asked for the recare sectc9r.
moval of barriers-to-entry in phy-
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tential success of Blue Cross.
affiliates also see non-SHP patients and many of
This paper will first describe Marshfield these patients are referred to the Marshfield
in more detail. Second, it will describe the ben- Clinic for specialty services as well.
efits that Blue Cross would receive from winThe Marshfield Clinic also controls the
ning this case and will estimate the costs to Blue 524-bed St. Joseph's Hospital, the largest hospiCross in this litigation. The paper also will esti- tal in the Northwest Wisconsin market. It is a
mate the potential benefits to third parties if Blue nonprofit hospital owned and operated by the
Cross were to win this case. Finally it will esti- Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother. Only physicians
mate the public good aspects of this case, and employed by the Marshfield Clinic have full staff
identify the market characteristics under which privileges. 9 St. Joseph's also has the most sophisfirms will bring antitrust cases when others will ticated equipment; specializing in cardiac surbe able to benefit from the result.
gery, neonatal care, and oncology in the area. The
three other hospitals in central and northern Wisconsin with more than 200 staffed beds are
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Marshfield
Clinic
Wausau Hospital, Sacred Heart Hospital-Eau
Claire, and Luther Hospital.
The Marshfield Clinic is the fifth largest
The physician product market may be
clinic in the United States. It consists of 400 phybroken out into primary, pediatric, and specialty
sicians, 300 of whom practice at the Marshfield
care components. Cross-elasticity of demand for
Clinic in Marshfield, Wisconsin.5 In addition to
primary care services and pediatric services apthe Marshfield Clinic headquarters, the Clinic
pears to be low. Although some children would
owns and operates 23 satellite clinics throughoccasionally visit a primary care physician, most
out northwest Wisconsin. There are between
would probably see pediatricians. Adults would
three and fifteen physicians at each of these clinrarely visit a pediatrician.
ics with many of the physicians practicing priSpecialty care physicians were defined
mary care medicine. Most of the physicians at
in terms of services delivered in 400 plus diagthe Marshfield Clinic headquarters are specialty nostic-related-groups
("DRGs") at in-patient
care physicians. Marshfield physicians are paid
hospital
settings.
It
was
believed, for example,
on a salary basis.6
that there was little cross-elasticity of demand
Since 1986 the Marshfield Clinic has
between, for example, eye surgery and different
been sole owner of Security Health Plan ("SHIP"),
types of heart surgery. It was also believed that
an individual practice association ("IPA") HMO
there was little cross-elasticity of supply for difbased in Marshfield, with 300 non-Marshfield
ferent types of surgeons and physicians.
employed physician affiliates and approximately
The Marshfield Clinic market share ex70,0007 enrollees throughout northwest and cenceeded 60 percent of patient events (the number
tral Wisconsin. The physician affiliates are paid
of times that patients saw physicians during the
on a capitated basis, and are required by conyear) for each of three years from 1991-1994 in
tract to refer all of their SHP patients to
nine of thirteen satellite clinics of Marshfield in
Marshfield for specialized care. 8 The physician primary physician
care and in eight of thirteen
1995-1996
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clinics in pediatric care. The other ten clinics privileges at the four hospitals dominated by
had insufficient data or consisted mostly of spe- Marshfield including St. Joseph's Hospital."
This, of course, inhibits growth of primary care
cialty physicians.
The specialty markets consisted of the or specialty care physicians. Marshfield physinumber of procedures performed at St. Joseph's cians also would refuse to provide cross coverHospital where only Marshfield Clinic physicians age to non-Marshfield physicians who needed
practiced. In fourteen markets including cardiac to be absent from their practice for a few days.
valve surgery, bypass surgery, and chemotherapy, Marshfield also enforced a non-compete clause
St. Joseph's Hospital performed more than 60 with its formerly employed physicians which
percent of the procedures in the relevant geo- kept such physicians from practicing medicine
within thirty miles of the Marshfield Clinic for
graphic market for the years 1991-1994.
three years after terThe relevant
mination.
geographic market
Another
for primary care phy- Only Marshfield physicians
barrier
to
the spesicians and pediatriprivileges
staff
were
provided
cialty care physician
cians was defined in
services market is
terms of geographic
at the four hospitals
the Wisconsin capimarkets surrounding
by
Marshfield
dominated
tal expenditure reeach of the twentyview
program
three satellite clinics.
St.
Joseph's
including
("CER") which reA thirty-mile radius
quires approval
was set, and was in- Hospital.
through the Cost
creased by ten-mile
increments until Elzinga-Hogarty calculations Containment Commission of most expenditures
of 75 percent combined LIFO (Little-In-From- exceeding $1,000,000 for hospital-based instiOutside) and LOFI (Little-Out-From-Inside) tutions and exceeding $500,000 for clinic based
institutions.' 2 Because of pressure by existing
were met.'0
For specialty care markets, a map was hospitals, it is often difficult to justify to reguladrawn which would encompass all of Northwest tory agencies the entry of a new hospital or the
Wisconsin based on the referring patterns of purchase of new equipment. Without new terMarshfield Clinic's 23 satellite clinics. Elzinga- tiary care facilities, specialists will be deterred
Hogarty statistics were calculated for each of the from entering the market.
Finally, the referral network to
more than 400 DRGs in the geographic area with
nearly all passing the 75 percent Elzinga-Hogarty Marshfield Clinic physicians may increase the
proficiency of specialty services as more procecut-off point.
Along with the high market shares of the dures are performed at Saint Joseph's Hospital.
Marshfield Clinic are the high barriers-to-entry This increased number of procedures can be a
for physician services erected by Marshfield. circular phenomenon which may lead to even
Only Marshfield physicians were provided staff more referrals to specialty care, thus creating a
120 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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barrier-to-entry. At the same time, specialists will
refer patients back to the primary care physicians
of Marshfield.
Patients who visit a Marshfield Clinic
physician generally are aware that for specialty
services the patient would be referred to a
Marshfield Clinic specialist and would most
likely be treated at St. Joseph's Hospital. Referrals increase the demand for Marshfield Clinic
primary care physicians which, in turn, increases
the referral to and demand for Marshfield Clinic
specialists.
The dominance of St. Joseph's Hospital
engendered by the link between Marshfield
Clinic's primary and specialty care appears to
be reflected in its financial data. St. Joseph's rate
of return computed as net income as a percent of
total assets was 13.5 percent in 1991,13 compared
to 7.7 percent at Sacred-Heart Hospital-Eau
Claire, 6.3 percent at Wausau, and 6.8 percent at
Luther. 4 St. Joseph's rate of return on equity for
1991 was 18.2 per cent compared to 9.6 per cent
at Sacred Heart, 15.0 per cent at Wausau, and
11.5 per cent at Luther.'5 These high rates of return may reflect the market dominance of
Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital in
specialty services in the Northwest Wisconsin
market.
The Marshfield Clinic and its primary and
specialty physicians, the St. Joseph's Hospital,
and the Security HMO, formed a vertically integrated network. Each of the components of the
network led to the monopolization of primary
care and specialty physician services. The St.
Joseph's Hospital benefitted by the stream of
Marshfield referrals. It also benefitted by the
patients from Security HMO. Yet the biggest
beneficiaries were the Marshfield physicians.
Because of their control of St. Joseph's and three
1995-1996

additional hospitals, it was very difficult for new
physicians to enter the market. Control of Security also made it difficult for non-Marshfield
physicians to gain referrals. Those physicians
who were affiliated with Security were required
to refer to Marshfield and often referred nonMarshfield patients as well. The loss of Security
patients could be a devastating blow for noncompliance.
There were no attempts made to calculate the potential benefits of vertical integration.
One such benefit may be to provide information
to the patient such that getting into the Marshfield
system would provide a certain level of health
care. There were also no attempts made to calculate the costs of vertical integration other than
to suggest that vertical integration here can lead
to monopoly power. In general, vertical integration can be benign except when linked to the establishment of monopoly power. In the health
care industry, the probability of hospital staff
privilege foreclosure and HMO referrals can
make vertical integration suspect where there are
high market shares of hospitals coupled with an
HMO presence.
Potential benefits to Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Wisconsin of an antitrust
victory
The damages of the refusal to deal with
Compcare were calculated at approximately $5.1
million from 1990 to 1995.16 In addition to the
damages incurred by the exclusion of the
Compcare HMO, Blue Cross was affected by the
high prices of Marshfield physician services. For
primary care, pediatric care, and specialty care
services, the damages were calculated at approximately $595,000.11 When trebled under the

Feature Articles e 121

Sherman Act the damages total to $17.1 million. 8
Were there also other benefits which
might accrue to Blue Cross? Perhaps there might
be value of deterring other physician groups in
Wisconsin who might not negotiate with Blue
Cross. In addition, although Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans throughout the United States form
a weak association, benefits may be positive to
many other plans in the Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association. Quantification of these last
two possible benefits were not possible.

percent chance of winning in order to bring this
suit. Blue Cross, of course, had to take into consideration risks such that the potential evidence
would not be as convincing as Blue Cross believed, or defendant's had evidence about which
Blue Cross was unaware.
Public benefits if Blue Cross wins

If Blue Cross wins, entry will be easier
for other HMOs which would like to enter the
northwest Wisconsin market since Marshfield
would have to negotiate with all potential entrants. It will also reduce prices of physician serPotential costs to Blue Cross and Blue
vices to all health care plans since physician's
Shield
services will no longer be monopolized.
The costs to Blue Cross are equal to atHow does one measure the public bentorney fees, other consultant fees, and the op- efits? The public benefits would be equal to the
portunity costs of Blue Cross officials and em- market share of the private and public third party
ployees who helped with document preparation insuring organizations in the state minus the
and assistance on this case. The attorney fees are market share of Blue Cross. Thus, Blue Cross
approximately $2.5 million according to the pa- has a market share of seventeen percent in 1993
pers filed with the District Court; economic con- with eighty-three percent for the other insuring
sulting fees approximately $400,000; and the op- organizations, leaving out potential entry. Thus,
portunity costs of Blue Cross individuals is at a the bulk of the gains will accrue to non-Blue
minimum of $64,000 (based on two executives Cross subscribers.
at a two-week trial and six weeks of effort prior
to trial) with no guarantee of winning. Total costs Why would firms
bring antitrust actions
were, therefore, approximately $3.0 million.
when other parties benefit?
Moreover, there is the possibility of fuThere is a greater proportion of private
ture legal and consulting costs and opportunity
antitrust
suits brought today than at any time in
costs of Blue Cross officials during an appeals
the nation's history.' 9 Prior to the 1980s, private
process.
firms brought six times as many suits as the government, whereas in the 1980s, there were ten
The benefits and costs to Blue Cross and
times as many suits.20 According to the
Blue Shield of bringing legal action
Georgetown University study of antitrust litigaWith a benefit-to-cost ratio of 17 to 3 tion, private suits have been predominant dur($17 million awarded by the judge at a $3 mil- ing the forty-three years (from 1941-1984) of
lion cost), Blue Cross needed less than a twenty
122 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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their study.2 More than 1,000 private antitrust Marshfield, Blue Cross may have had marketsuits are filed each year. Of course, not all cases ing and brand name advantages over other health
have public good effects and may involve sim- insuring organizations. Blue Cross may have
ply internal private disputes between the par- been able to gain large benefits before new firms
ties.
could decide when and if to enter as well the
First, it appears that firms will bring an- period of time in developing brand name loyaltitrust actions when the internal benefits exceed ties.
the internal costs; adjusted for risk of winning
Fifth, the average plaintiff gains 1.2 perthe suit. All things equal, benefits will be greater, cent of the equity value of the firm in wealth gains
the greater the market share of the firm. One when the announcement of the antitrust filing
might also hypothesize that higher market shares occurs. 22 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconwill allow firms to capture most or a good por- sin as a for-profit firm, might have foreseen simition of the benefits. This will allow firms to re- lar increases in wealth.
duce the public benefits of the antitrust action.
A second hypothesis is that firms would Conclusion
be more willing to bring an antitrust action when
There are a number of reasons why firms
no other potential competitor has a market share
may
bring
private antitrust suits even though
which is significant. With a significant market
share, the next largest firm would be able to cap- there are possibilities of public good effects
ture most of the public benefits and challenge which accrue to other firms. Public policy officials at the Department of Justice or the Federal
the leading firm on an equal basis.
Third, a firm is more anxious to bring an Trade Commission may want to be cognizant of
action when significant damages can be collected the factors which lead firms to bring private anfor past antitrust violations. As we have seen, titrust suits and reserve their resources for cases
Blue Cross was awarded a $17 million judgment in which these or other factors are not present.
There may also be the possibility of filing an
for just five years of antitrust damages.
Fourth, firms may bring antitrust suits amicus brief.In cases which involve significant
when there may be substantial time lags before legal precedent, however, public policy officials
the entry of new firms. For example, in may want to act regardless of private action.
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Dr. Greenberg participated as an expert opinion economist,
retained by Blue Cross and Compcare, in the litigation surrounding this article. A majority of the background and opinions are taken from Dr. Greenberg's expert report. Dr.
Greenberg's expert report is on file in the offices of the Loyola
Consumer Law Reporter.
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U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (1995).

WIsc.

STAT. ANN.

§ 133.03(2) (1995).

"See generally Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 881 F. Supp. 1309
(W.D. Wisc. 1994); Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 883 E Supp.
1247 (W.D. Wisc. 1995); Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 65 F.3d
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DEPT.
(1991-1993)).

1406 (7th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross v. Marshfield, No. 94 C
137 S, 1995 WL 1100115 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 5, 1995).
' See generally Warren Greenberg's Expert Report [hereinafter
Greenberg], at 4 (citing Marshfield Clinic Physician Recruiting Brochure, The Marshfield Clinic: ForThe One In Four at
19, n.d.).
6 Greenberg, supra note 5.
7 Greenburg, supra note 5, at 5. (citing WIsc. OFFICE OF THE
COMM'R OF INS., PREPAID HEALTH PLANS IN WISC. (1993)).

Greenberg, supra note 5, at 5.
9 Greenburg, supra note 5, at 4.
0

' Greenburg, supra note 5, at 7, 13 (citing Kenneth G. Elzinga
and Thomas F.Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation in Antimerger Suits 45, 81 (The Antitrust Bulletin 18(l), Spring 1973).
"Greenberg, supra note 5, at 1I.
"Greenburg, supra note 5, at 10.
3
1 The only year for which data is available.
' 4Greenberg, supra note 5, at 19 (citing Wisc. OFFICE
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15Greenberg, supra note 5, at 19 (citing Wisc. OFCE OF
CARE INFO., DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOC. SERV.,

Div.

HEALTH

OF HEALTH

(1991-1993)).
6

See Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 883 F Supp. 1247, 1262 (W.D.
Wisc. 1995).

7

Id.

1

'sBlue Cross v. Marshfield, No. 94 C 137 S, 1995 WL 110115
(W.D. Wisc. Jan. 5, 1995).
"gJohn M. Bizjak and Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of PrivateAntitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm,
85 AMER. ECON. REV. 436, 461 (1995).
2
ld. at 436.
2
,Greenberg, supra note 5 (citing Steven C. Salop and Lawrence
J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and
Framework, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LIT. 3 (LAWRENCE J. WHITE ED.,
1988)).
22

Bizjak and Coles, supra note 19, at 437.
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